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ALUMNI NOTES.
L. Philip Coblentz, '00, has opened an
office at Iola, Allen county, Kansas.
Hutchinson, '98, is at present located in

Pittsburg and acting in the capacity of
Secretary to the President of the Carey
Furnace Company.
Savidge, '97, spent some days in town
about Easter. Heisassociated witllMahan
in the practice of law, at Shamokin. He
reports that lie is getting along very well.
J. Frey Gilroy, '96, spent several days
in town during March.
Irving, '98, of New York, was a March
visitor.

Basehore, '01, transacted legal business
in town during the month.
SCHOOL NOTES.
Quite a number of the students took
advantage of the brief Easter recess to
visit their homes.

Bishop, of the Middle class, was the
recipient of many favorable comments
on his solos while with the Glee Club on
its recent trip.
Knappenberger and Hugus, Juniors,
successfully passed examinations on the
first year's work of the course prescribed
in Westmoreland county.
The Seniors have taken their final examination in Constitutional Law and
taken up Bills and Notes in its stead.
The Law School is well represented
on the baseball teani, furnishing more
than half the players, viz :-Carlin, Callnon, Shiffer, Spencer, Dively, and Oldt.
Cannon, of the Middle class, is captain of
the team.
MRS. MARY COOPER ALLISON.
It was with great regret that we learned
a few days ago, of the death of this charitable lady. The Law School owes its resuscitation in 189U, very largely to the influence of the late William C. Allison, of
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Philadelphia, without whose aid, in preparing the building, the project could not
have been carried out. During the brief
residue of his life, Mr. Allison showed a
constant solicitude for the success of the
school. Within a year or two after his
death, Mrs. Allison, his widow, remembering his interest, gave $1,000 towards
the purchase of books for the library. A
few years ago, she visited Carlisle during
Commencement, and pleasantly received
the students who called upon her in a
body. She has frequently expressed her
abiding interest in our progress. Mrs.
Allison was a vivacious, kindly woman,
intelligent and sympathetic. She was
the friend of the poor, and of the agencies
designed to instruct, edify, and alleviate
the calamities of her fellow men. Her
will contains numerous bequests for religious and charitable objects.
We are
grateful to her for bequeathing $5,000 to
the use of the Law School. We hope to
be able to give a fuller account of the life
of this estimable lady in the May issue of
THE FoRUM.
HISTORICAL SOCIETY.
The following constitution has been
adopted by the Legal Historical Society:
We, the members of the Dickinson
School of Law, in order to more effectually assist in the advancement of the legal
profession by the cultivation of the profoundest respect for, and the preservation
and perpetuation of the-historyof the same,
and the memory of its members, to aid
in the compilation and preservation of
the history of the judicial districts of
Pennsylvania, as well as that of the
higher courts, and to stimulate legal historical investigation generally, and the
collection of portraits, letters, diaries, rare
books, pictures, etc., do organize ourselves
into a body and adopt the following constitution.
ARTICLE I.
NAME.

This organization shall be known as
the Legal Historical Society of the Dickinson School of Law.
ARTICLE II.
MEMBERSHIP.

See. 1.-Students, former students and
alumni of the Dickinson School of Law,

can become active members by paying to
the Treasurer, twenty-five cents.
Sec. 2.-Any Attorney at-Law, Judge
of the Courts, or Incorporator of the Dickinson School of Law can become an honorary member, and may participate in any
meeting of the Society, but shall not have
a vote.
ARTICLE III.
OFFICERS.

See. 1. Title.-The officers of this Societ , shall consist of a President, VicePresident, Secretary, Treasurer and Executive Committee of three members.
Sec. 2. Nomination.-Nominations for
officers shall be made by a nominating
committee, consisting of five membersthe three regularly elected members of
the Executive Committee and two additional members to be appointed by the
President.
The Nominating Committee shall report
rot less than two nominees for each office
at the same meeting at which the election
is held, or at a meeting preceding such
election.
See. 3. Terms and Elections:-IOpon
the first Friday in February, all officers
shall be elected by ballot, by a majority of
all the votes cast, for a term of one year :
Provided that the term of the officers now
serving or about to be elected shall expire
at the next election.
Sec. 4. Eligibility-All officers shall be
active members, and the President and
Vice-President shall be chosen from the
two upper classes.

ARTICLE IV.
DUTIES

OF OFFICERS.

Sec. 1. President-The President shall,
upon entering upon his duties, or within
a reasonable time thereafter, appoint an
" Historian of the Society," and make
such other appointments as may appear
necessary or may be recommended by the
Executive Committee.
Sec. 2. Treasurer-The Treasurer shall
pay funds only upon presentation of orders signed by the President, and countersigned by the chairman of the Executive
Committee. lHe shall make a report in
writing of the condition of the finances at
the close of his term of office and then deliver all funds of the Society into the
hands of his successor.
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Sec. 3. Other Officers-All officers in
addition to those enumerated in Sections
1 and 2, shall perform all duties usually
devolving upon such respective officers.
ARTICLE V.
MANAGEMENT.

The general management shall be under the control of an Executive Committee consisting of three regularly elected
members, the President of the Society,
and the Dean of the Dickinson School of
Law, as ex-offieio members.
ARTICLE VI.
HISTORIAN.

It shall be the duty of the Historian of
the Society, to solicit contributions as set
forth in the Preamble, to supervise the
general historical work of the society, and
to edit matter for publication.
ARTICLE VII.
VACANCIES.

Vacancies shall be filled by appointment by the President.
ARTICLE VIII.
'MEETIN(GS.

Sec. I.-The President shall call meetings at his discretion, and also upon the
written request of five members.
In the absence of both President and
Vice President, the written request shall
be handed to the chairman of the Executive Committee, who shall act in the capacity of the above named officers, in such
emergency.
Sec. 2. Quorum.-A Quorum shall consist of a number equal to one-fifth of all
the students of the Dickinson School of
Law who are members.
ARTICLE IX.
ORDER.

Roberts' Rules of Order shall be authority to decide all questions of order not
otherwise provided for.
ARTICLE X.
AMENDMENTS.

This Constitution may be altered or
amended by a two-thirds vote of all the
voting members present, provided, a written proposition to that effect be posted
upon the bulletin board in the Law Building, for two weeks prior to the time of

voting, and provided the Executive Committee recommend the adoption of the
proposed amendment or alteration, at the
meeting for action upon such proposition.
J. C. HOUSER,
J. E. BRENNAN,

W. L. HoucK,
Committee.
ALLISON SOCIETY.
The meetings of the Allison Society
during the past month were unusually interesting. Every meeting was attended
by nearly the entire membership. Every
programme showed careful research and
preparation.
Among the interesting subjects debated
were the increasing of the presidential
term to six years; the reduction of tariff
on sugar raised in Cuba; the election of
U. S. Senators by popular vote. A talk
on politics by Wilcox, an oration by Carlin, recitations by Fleitz and Flynn were
interesting features of several meetings.
The officers who were elected to serve
for the remainder of the term were:
President-Longbottom.
Vice President-Burkhouse.
Secretary-Crary.
Executive Committee-Adamson, Hindman and Brennan.
The new officers are greatly encouraged
by the increased attendance and the great
interest being manifested. ,They look forward to a term of great activity.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The meeting of Friday, April 4, was a
pronounced success. Much effort was expended by the executive committee and
active members to get every member to
attend ; the result was an unusually large
attendance. Dickinson has even a larger
membership than was represented, so the
efforts to secure attendance should be continued.
Among the speakers were Rhodes, F.,
Davis, Mowry and Wilson. Their talks
were extempore, their subjects being assigned by the chair. The debate, "Resolved, that General Miles should be requested to resign, because of his attack
upon the Army Staff Bill before the United States Senate was discussed by Rhodes,
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J., and Schanz, on the affirmative, and
by Gross and Rhodes, F., ol the negative.
An interesting general debate followed.

No. 130. Turner,
No. 131.

DELTA CHL
Preparations have been begun for the
annual banquet, which takes place at the
close of the term. The committee of arrangements has been appointed. A number of the Alumni are expected to be
present for the banquet. During the
month J. Edward Hindman, of the Junior
Class, was initiated.

No. 132.

The following is a continuation of the
Moot Court cases assigned:

No. 135.

Plaintiff

No. 117.

No. 118.

No. 119.

No. 120.

No. 121.

No. 122.

No. 123.

No. 124.

No. 125.

No. 126.

No. 127.

No. 128.

No. 129.

Defendant

Prickett,
Morehouse,
Yocum.
Brundage,
Walsh, J.
Cisney,
Bishop,
Welsh.
Donahoe,
Dever, J.
Lourimer,
Shomo,
Cook.
Dively,
Phillips, J.
Hindman,
Gross,
Fox.
Hickernell,
Hamblin, J.
Williamson,
Schanz,
Gerber.
Myers,
Jones, J.
Conry,
Adamson,
Sterrett.
McIntire,
McKeehan, J.
Willis,
Wilcox,
Spencer.
Wingert,
Phillips, J.
Boryer,
Osborne,
Minnich.
Brook,
Lonergan, J.
Thorne,
Elmes,
Rhodes, F.
Brooks,
Moon; J.
Keelor,
Delaney,
Drumheller.
Wright,
Cannon, 3.
Longbottom,
Claycomb,
Vastine.
Cisney,
Cooper, J.
Miller,
Mays,
Jones.
Ebbert,
Delaney, J.
Lonergan,
Houser,
Points.
McKeehan,
Sterrett, J.

No. 133.

No. 134.

Moon,

Brennan.
Cooper,
Rhodes, F.
MacConnell,
Davis,
Laubenstein, Rhodes, 3.
McIntire, J.
Hamblin,
Hindman,
Sherbinu.
Wanner,
Cisney. 3.
Phillips,
Mowry,
Core.
Crary,
Delaney, 3.
Watson,
Walsh,
Bishop,
Yeagley,
Crary, 3.
Cannon,
Dever.
Kline,
Bouton,
Donahoe, J.

MOOT COURT.
STOKE vs. THURSTON.
Landlord and tenant-Tenant's covenant
to repair-Defectsin prernises-Liability for injuries.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Thurston owning a house in fee, leased
it to Abrams for four years. The house
was in fair condition at the time. The
lease required the tenant to make repairs.
Three years and seven months after the
tenant took possession, two shingles of
the roof became loose, the wind blew them
on the sidewalk, and in falling one struck
Stoke, hurting him. This is an action
for the damages. It was agreed that the
damages were$500, if defendant was liable.
MowRY and SHIFFER for the plaintiff.
WALSH and SHO O for the defendant.
The tenant is responsible for defects in
the premises. Bears v. Ambler,9 Pa. 193;
Reading City v. Reiner, 167 Pa. 41.
Where there is an unconditional agreement to repair, the tenant is bound to do
so. Hay v. Holt, 91 Pa. 88; Hubler v.
Baum, 152 Pa. 626,1 Long v. Fitzsimmons,
1 W. & S. 530; Fow v. Roberts, 108 Pa.
4S9.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This case presents the question, whether
or not there is negligence. If so, who is
negligent?
If there is negligence, it is clear that the
landlord is not guilty of it, as he is not in
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possession and is therefore not liable to
third parties unless he is in full control 6f
the premises and has expressly agreed to
make repairs which agreement must be
distinctly proved. Tannery v. Drinkhouse, 2 W. N. C. 210; Hubler v. Baum.
152 Pa. 626.
In this case there is an unconditional
agreement to repair, and the tenant is
bound to do so though the premises be destroyed by fire. Hoy v. Holt, 91 Pa. 88.
The landlord is liable only for defective
construction or condition at and before
the tenancy began. Wunder v. MeClain,
134 Pa. 334. Hence the tenant alone is responsible for defects in the premises, if
they were not apparent when he took
possession. Bears v. Ambler, 9 Pa. 193;
Reading v. Reiner, 167 Pa. 41.
But we think that the plaintiff has no
cause of action, even on the facts stated,
as we cannot see that there was any negligence. The facts show that when the defendant, Thurston, parted with the property "it was in fair condition."
The roof of a house is of such peculiar
construction, that if there are any defects
they are not discoverable upon careful in_
spection, and we are to presume, in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary,
that the defendant employed skilled
workmen, and that the roof was laid in
the ordinary skillful manner. Having
done this, the defendant performed his
duty to the public and therefore is not
guilty of any negligence.
If he had no actual knowledge, and it
nowhere appears that he had, lie could
only be liable, if he could be made liable
at all, if it appeared that the roof was
in such a delapidated condition as to be
noticeable on ordinary inspection, or that
the shingles were loose for a time long
enough that he might or ought to have
discovered it. No such facts appear in
this case.
But waiving all this, could he be liable
for damages from such an occurrence if he,
himself, had been occupying the house,
and the shingles becoming loose had been
blown into the street, and in falling struck
some person and did injury? Is the injury sufficiently a proximate effect of the
shingles being loose as to render any one
liable? We are not satisfied that it is, and

believe that the injury is the result of inevitable accident.
For these reasons a judgment of nonsuit is entered against the plaintiff.
CORE, J.
McGRATH'S ESTATE.
Wills-Signing at the end thereof-Effect
of addition of words not of testamenta2W
character.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

June the 18th, 1901.
I, James McGrath, of Lake Como, Buckingham township, Wayne county, Pennsylvania. by occupation a farmer, make
this my last will. I give, devise and
bequeath my estate and property, real and
personal, as follows: That is to say,-I advise and direct that all myjust debts shall
be paid with convenient speed. I bequeath
to my sister Annie McGrath, of Lake
Coino, in Buckingham township, Wayne
county, Pennsylvania, all my real estate
and personal property.
His
JAMES MCGRATH X
Mark
I appoint Annie McGrath, of Buckingham township, and David McLaughlin, of
Preston township, executrix and executor
of this my will.
Witness: DENNISS MORAN.
Witness: JOHN CLUNE.
The above will was offered for probate
August l3th, 1901. There was evidence
that the will down to and including the
signature was written on June 18th, 1901,
in the presence of the two witnesses, and
that they then subscribed their names,
and that on June 22nd, the sentence appointing the executors was inserted Miss
McGrath and David McLaughlin ask for
letters testamentary.
TURNER and MCINTIRE for the plaintiff.
The addition of words not of a testamentary character does not affect the
validity of a will. 107 Pa. 318; 118 Pa. 37;
6 Pa. 409.
STERRETT and BROOK for the defendant.
The clause must take effect as a codicil
if at all. It cannot take effect as a codicil
as it is not signed at the end thereof. An
unexecuted codicil will not revoke a will.
Act April 8, 1833; 20 Phila. 94; 31 Pa. 246.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

The above will was offered for probate
August 13, 1901, and the executrix with
the executor named therein applied for
letters testamentary.
The applicants contend that the writings, including the clause appointing the
executrix and executor below the signature, constitute the will from which they
hope to obtain the grantingof their request,
and that the addition of the words below
the signature in this will was not of a
Vestamentary character, consequently do
not affect the validity of the will.
The defendants ask that the writing
above the signature of the deceased be
admitted to probate, but that the clause
appointing the executrix and executor,
which is below the signature of the
testator shall not be probated.
The act of April 8, 1833, requires that
every will shall be in writing, unless the
person making the same shall be prevented by the extremity of his last sickness, shall be signed by him at the end
thereof, or by some person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and in all
cases shall be proved by the oaths or
affirmations of two or more competent
witnesses, otherwise such will shall be of
no effect.
The appeal of John Wineland et al, 118
Pa. 37, has been cited. In this case
Benjamin Wineland, on April 26, 1880,
executed his last will and testament, devising and bequeathing to different devisees and legatees his estate upon certain
conditions, after which he signed his
name, following his name were these
words II will that Cephas Lash and Henry
Wineland be my executors," then came
the signatures of the two witnesses. Wineland's will was offered for probate and
was probated by the register, from which
an appeal was taken, the register and
Chief
Orphan's court being reversed.
Justice Paxson said "that the clause appointing executors to a will is one of the
important parts of the will, although not
always essential, and it cannot be brushed
aside as mere idle words, to which no
meaning is attached, nor can they be
rejected and so much of the will be probated as stands above the signature." In
consequence of these thoughts all of the
will was made invalid.

We do not think part of this opinion is
in harmony with the statute of April 8,
1833, for we think that Wineland's will
should have been probated excluding the
executor's clause, because the clause appointing the executors and the signatures
as witnesses were necessarily written
after the signing of the will, which made
it complete as to the part above the signature. SupposeWinelandshould have died
the moment he had completed his signature, the statute would certainly have
been complied with, and the will would
have been valid.
In Hays v. Harden, 6 Pa. 409. The
plaintiff offered in evidence a written
document purporting to be the will ofJohn
Hays, which contained a recital, then a
clause appointing executors and directing
the payment of debts, after which he devised all his leaseholdi estate to Abraham
Hays, which was followed by his signature.
A clause was then added stating his
reasons for making the will, after which
was the signature of two witnesses. In
this case it was held that a testamentary
paper to constitute a valid will under the
act of April 8, 1833, must be signed at the
end thereof, hence a paper which contained, after the signature of the testator,
a clause stating his reasons for making
the devise, which clause was not signed
at the end thereof, is not a valid will.
In this case we make the same exceptions to the ruling of the court. The
will was valid the moment that the signature of the testator was finished. That
there need be no subscribing witnesses to
make a will valid, has been so often ruled
we need cite no authority. The moment
after the will was made valid and complete by the signature of the testator, any
other words, reasons, changes, orbequests
must be words to make a codicil. Having
once completed a will it cannot be revoked
by a codicil or other means saVe that provided by the atatute, which is as follows:
"No will in writing concerning any real
estate shall be repealed, nor shall any
devise or direction therein be altered,
otherwise than by some other will, or
codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same, executed and proved in
the same manner as herein before provided, or by burning, cancelling or obliterating or destroying the same by the
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testator himself or by some one in his
presence and by his express direction.
The above part of this statute, wherein it
says "as is herein before provided," means
that it be executed as the statute provides
for wills, signed at the end thereof, etc.
In Heiser v. Heiser, 31 Pa. 246, the following facts were before the court. Patience Heiser executed' her will July 7,
1852, and placed it for preservation in the
hands of J. W. Cottell; but a year or two
subsequently, she obtained the will from
him, and added immediately below her
signature. "I give to my son my 8 day
clock. I give to each of my grandchildren
a bed and bedding," after which she signed
her name. Then came the words "I do
give to my children all my plates and six
large table spoons, one-half dozen of teaspoons, one cream mug, salt spoons and
tea tongs." No signature was after this
bequest. The court held that the last
clause was an unexecuted codicil and will
be of no effect either in changing the will
or giving of the last bequest, and that a
testamentary writing once perfect, can
only be revoked as pointed out in the 13th
section of statute of wills.
In the willof Charles Smith, 20 Phila. 94,
it was held that the failure of a testator to
attach his signature to an addition at the
end of a will, which was otherwise complete, does not render the whole will invalid. The addition is to be regarded as
an unexecuted codicil, and the will itself
being otherwise valid, will be admitted to
probate, while the unsigned codicil will be
invalid and will be refused probate.
The court is of the opinion that a will
duly executed is entitled to be probated
that instant, and any wriing added below
the signature, if only a moment later or if
four or twenty-four days later, is the beginning of another will or a codicil, and
for the subsequent'part to become part of
the will so that it may be probated with
it, must come under the above statute.
This will should be probated without the
subsequent words appointing the exdcutor
and executrix, consequently the applicants are refused papers of administration.
BORYER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

We do not think it necessary in reaching its result to adopt the criticisms by the
learned court below of the decisions in
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Wineland's Appeal, 118 Pa. 37, and in
Hays v. Harden, 6 Pa. 409. In these
cases it did not appear that the appended
words were written after the signature to
the will, and as a distinct act. They and
the rest of the will were probhbly written
at the same sitting. James McGrath's
will was written on June 18th, 1901. It
was a valid will, and it remained such for
four days at least. To suppose that the insertion of the clause appointing executors
revoked it, is to ignore the provisions of
the 13th section of the act of 1833, which
prescribes how, only, a will may be revoked.
TWGrath's will has not been
burnt, cancelled, obliterated or destroyed.
Nor has it been repealed or altered by a
will, or codicil, or writing, declaring the
intention to repeal or alter, "executed and
proved," as a will must be. The inserted
sentence neither became testamentary,
nor did it repeal the testamentary paper
upon which it was written.
Appeal dismissed.
NEW BANK vs. SMITH.
Gambling transaction- Cheek given in
payment of-Notification to stop payment-Forgetfulness of bank officiasPayment- Forgetfulness as groundfor
action for money had and received,
founded on mistake-Relation of bank
to payee-Liability of bankforwrongful
payment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Orris was a depositor in the
New Bank. He gave the defendant on
January 1, 1900, a check for $1,000.00, in
settlement of a gambling transaction. After giving the same, he notified the bank
to stop payment and told Smith of this.
On January 1, 1901, Smith deposited the
check in the Carlisle Bank, and received
credit therefor. The bank forwarded the
check. The plaintiff had forgotten the
notice and paid the check. Soon after it
discovered its mistake, repaid Orris, and
brings this action against Smith.

HousER and

MCKEEHAN

for the plain-

tiff.
In Pennsylvania, recovery is allowed
where money is paid by mistake. Ward
v. McCue, 31 Pitts. L. J. 160; D'Utrich
v. Melchor, 1 Dall. 428; Ritchie v. Sum.
mers, 3 Yeates, 530.
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Recovery is allowed where money is
wrongfully paid through forgetfulness.
Kerr v. Ames, 39 Leg. Int. 392.
LONERG.AN and POINTS for the defendant.
There is no privity of interest between
the "New Bank" and Smith. Smith did
not get his money direct from plaintiffs.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Abundant authority exists for tile principle that an action for money had and
received is a most liberal action and may
be as comprehensive as a. bill in equity.
"Wheaever one man has in his hands the
money of another, which he 6ught to pay
over, he is liableto this action * * * when
the fact is proved that he has the money,
if he cannot show that he has legal or
equitable ground for retaining it, the law
creates the privity and the promise." Hall
v. Marston, 17 Mass. 574. Cf. Dana v.
Kemble. 34 Mass. 545. "It lies for the recovery of money which in equity, justice
and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff, and which defendant ought not under
all the circumstances to retain." Haven
v. Foster, 26 Mass. 111. Keeping this
principle in mind we proceed to an examination of the case. A check was drawn
on the New Bank, which check was in
settlement of a gambling transaction.
Subsequently, and before the bank had
committed itself to the payment thereof,
payment was stopped. Has the drawer
of a check the right to stop payment ? We
think le has if done at any time prior to
the bank's having committed itself to the
payment. In Kahn v. Walton, 46 Ohio
St. 195, a contract was made asa cover for
gambling in the prices of wheat, etc.
Kahn was a commission broker, doing
business with and for Ream & Co., and
bought of or through them wheat and
pork for future delivery, so-called, on Walton's account. Walton was loser, and
drew his two checks, amounting to $2,000,
on the bank where he had funds, payable
to Kahn, for money paid by him in the
deals andlosses. Kahn telegraphed to the
bank, inquiring if Walton's checks for the
amount of those drawn to him were good,
and received an affirmative answer. Walton notified the bank not to pay the
checks. It was contended, that tle drawing of the checks by Walton on the bank
where he had sufficient funds to pay

them, and the bank's response to the inquiry of Kahn's agent, that checks to that
amount were good, was a specific appropriation of the fund, and amounted to
payment of the debt for which they were
drawn; whereby the contract became
fully executed. Williams, J, said, "A
check, being simply a written order of a
depositor to his banker to make a certain
payment out of his funds, is executory,
and, of course, revocable at any time before the bank has paid it, or committed itself to its payment. * * *c The bank is
the agent of the drawer. Its duty is to
pay his money as he directs. It owes no
duty to the holder, except under the
drawer's directions, until by virtue of
those directions it assumessome obligation
to tile holder. Up to that tilne the latest
order from the drawer governs." Again
in Florence Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U.
S. 385, Justice Field says, "A general deposit in a bank is so much money to the
depositor's credit ; it is a debt to him by
the bank, payable on demand to his order,
not property capable of identification and
specific appropriation. A check upon the
bank in the usual form, not, accepted or
certified by its cashier as good, does not
constitute a transfer of any money to the
credit of the holder; it is simply an order
which may be countermanded, and payment forbidden by the drawerat any time
before it is actually cashed."
Having discovered in the foregoing, the
right to stop payment so long as the bank
has not committed itself before notification, it becomes unnecessary in this connection, to consider the rights of parties
involved in gambling transactions to rescind their engagement and recover tie
amount deposited with astakeholder. The
bank having been notified that payment
should not be made, assumed, as between
the drawer and itself, the responsibility for
forgetfulness and consequent unauthorized
payment. In other words, if it paid the
check and charged Orris with it. it was
bound to indemnify Orris. Thisit didbefore bringing this action by repaying him,
and the bank thereupon became the owner
of time check. Payment to Smith was due
to forgetfulness of plaintiff bank that notice to stop payment had been given a
year before the check was presented. Can
recovery be had for money paid under
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mistake?

Does forgetfulness constitute

mistake? Both questions may be affirmatively answered.
As to the first, "The money was clearly
paid over to the defendant under a. mistake of fact, and, upon familiar principles,
an action can be maintained to recover it
back." Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4
Gray 518. ' 'Where money is paid by one
under mistake of his rights and his duty,
and which he was under no legal or Inoral
duty to pay, and which the recipient has
no right in good conscience to retain, it
may be recovered back, in an action of indebiatus assumpsit, whether such mistake be one of fact, orof law." Northrup
v. Graves, 19 Conn. 547. "Thata mistake
in fact, is a ground of repetition, is too
clear and too well settled to require argument or authority in its support." Haven
v. Foster. 26 Mass. Ill at 130. "The rule
is gePeral that money paid under mistake
of material tacts may be recovered back."
Lawrence v. Bank, 54 N. Y. 432. This
rule also finds recognition in our own
courts. "The books are full of authorities
to show that where moneyotIght not to be
retained, or where it has been paid by mistake, it may be recovered back." Ritchie
v. Summers, 3 Yeates 539; D'Ttricht v.
Melchor, 1 Dallas. 428; Meredith v.
Haines, ]4 W. N. C. 364.
Moreover, although the rule is not universal, it is generally held that the fact of
the plaintiff's mistake having been caused
by his own negligence will not, in the absence of other facts, bar a recovery. "It
is no answer to the plaintiff's claim, that
the mistake arose from the negligence of
the plaintiffs. The ground on which the
rule rests is, that money paid through
misapprehension of facts, in equity and
good conscience belongs to the party who
paid it; and cannot be justly retained by
the party receivfng it." Appleton Bank
y. McGilvray, 4 Gray 518; Lawrence v.
American National Bank, 54 N. Y. 432 ;
Kingston Bank v. Eltinge, 40 N. Y. 391;
Frank v. Lanier, 91 N. Y. 116.
The rule is, however, subject to the
qualification, that money so paid cannot
be reclaimed if "the defendant received it
in good faith, in satisfaction of an equitable claim, nor when it was due in honor
and conscience." Walker v. Conant, 65
Mich. 194; Mayer v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 455.

But, what right of the defendant will be
contravened if recovery is allowed?
Surely he has no standing to complain.
The tiansaction was a gambling one.
Statutory enactment declares notes, etc.,
given for security or satisfaction thereof,
to be void. Act April 22, 1794 8; the
courts will not enforce such contracts.
Lloyd v. Leisenring, 7 Watts 294. Had
the check or its money equivalent been in
the hands of a stakeholder, the loser
would be suffered to regain what he has
lost, at any time before it is delivered to
the winner, the locuspenitentiaenot being
narrowed to the interval between the
period of betting and the happening of
the contingency. M'Allister v. Hoffman,
16 S. & R. 146. Cf. Lloyd v. Leisenring,
7 Watts 294; M'Allister v. Gallaher, 3 P.
& W. 468. In fact, the whole transaction
being illegal, Smith at no time had a
right to the $1,000. Had the bank keptin
mind its notification and Smith had
sought in law to recover, he would have
had no standing; the transaction upon
which he would have founded his claim
being unlawful. "In such cases, equity
keeps hands off, and leaves the parties
where it finds them. It is a fundamental
rule of equity, that parties wanting itsaid
must come with clean hands. Courts of
equity require honesty, good faith and legality in transactions between men; and
if a party would pursue his remedy therein, his demand must not rest on a violation oflaw for its foundation, orarise from
his own illegal acts." Kahn v. Walton,
Supra.
Moreover, the defendant, beside knowing that the bet was illegal and that the
check given in satisfaction was uncollectible by him, had, with the bank, notice
that payment had been stopped. While
the reason for his delay in presenting it
does not appear, it is reasonable to suppose that it was in consequence of his notification that payment had been stopped
and he was prompted by the chance that
by refraining from immediate presentation, the notification would have passed
from the recollection of the bank officials
and he could profit by their forgetfulness.
Language too severe cannot be used in
condemnation of such an attempt to defraud. He took chances in the forgetfulness of the bank. They did forget and in
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consequence paid him the money. Asbetween the bank, an innocent party, and
Smith, who should be the loser? We have
already shown that Smith never had a
right to the money, therefore, as no right
is prejudiced, he loses nothing by being
compelled to repay the bank, the purposes of the statute are subserved and substantial equity is done. This leads us to
the final consideration, i. e. Does forgetfulness constitute mistake? It has long
been held that recovery can be had in
such a case. In Kelly v. Solari, 9 M. &
W. 54, the directors of a life insurance
company had been informed that the policy was forfeited in the lifetime of the insured, and after his death, having forgotten the fact, paid the money on demand
of the administratrix. Chief Baron Abinger, who had mis-directed the jury at
the trial, thus expresses himself in awarding a new trial, "I certainly laid down
the rule too widely to thejury when I told
them that if the directors once knew the
facts they must still be taken to know
them * * * I think the knowledge of
the facts which disentitles the party from
recovering, must mean a knowledge existing in the mind at the time of payment."
This case was quoted with approval by
Trunkey, J., in Meredith v. Haines, 14
W. N. C. 364, and the rule announced to
be that "Money paid by the plaintiff to
the defendant under a bonafide forgetfulness of facts, which disentitled the defendant to receive it, may be recovered
back; it is not sufficient to prevent a
party from recovering money paid by him
under a mistake of fact, that he had the
bheans of knowledge of the fact, unless he
paid it intentionally, not choosing to investigate the facts." See also, Kerr v.
Ames, 38 Leg. Int. 392 (P. & L. Vol. I-I,
Col. 4719) where a receiver, forgetting that
he had already paid a dividend, paid it
again to one who was .aware of the error,
and subsequently sued for its recovery.
The cause was submitted to the court, and
judgment was rendered for the receiver.
Paxson, J., affirmed this judgment. These
cases sufficiently establish the right of recovery, and judgment is therefore entered
for the plaintiff.
ELMES, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREM5E COURT.

After William Orris, a depositor in the
New Bank, had given his check to Smith
for$1000, and before the presentnient of the
check by Smith, he notified the bank not
to pay it. The check was not the assignment of any part of the fund on deposit.
2 Randolph, Commercial Paper, 1041.
Orris could therefore countermand the
order to the bank, before it had paid or
bound itself to pay, Smith. German
National Bank v. Farmers' Deposit Bank,
118 Pa. 294; Randolph, Com. Paper, p.
1042; Florence Mining Co. v. Brown, 124
U. S. 385; or, by assigning the deposit,
could make the check unavailable to obtain the fund from the bank. FirstNat.
Bank v. Gish, 72 Pa. 13. His death also
before its presentment, would revoke the
check.
Over a year after the check was drawn,
it was presented to the New Bank by the
Carlisle Bank. There were two reasons
why the New Bank should not have paid
it. (1) The notice not to pay was a sufficient reason. No one will contend that
that notice ought to have been repeated
from week to week or month to mouth, in
order to keep the revocation of the check
in the memory of the officers of the depos(2) The check was then
itary bank.
stale, and its very age was notice
that there was some defect in it which
deprived it of a claim to honor. "For
while age" remarks Daniel, "cannot invalidate a good check (unless the limitation has applied) and the fact that it was
dishonored when transferred, and that
presentment was delayed, does not lessen
the drawer's liability unless he has suffered loss, yet the lapse of a long period
from its date before its payment, is a circumstance so out of the ordinary course of
business that it ought to arouse suspicions
and excite inquiry. And the bank paying,
or the party receiving such a check, acts
at his peril." 2 Negot. Inst. 663. Lancaster Bank v. Woodward, 18 Pa, 357.
The New Bank paid the check despite
the discredit arising from its age, and despite the drawer's notice not to pay it.
The bank was plainly liable to Orris to
make good his deposit, against which it
charged the check. It has made good the
deposit and now seeks to make itself
whole. But from whom?
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The check was presented to the New
Bank for payment by the Carlisle Bank,
and, we may suppose, bore the endorsement of the latter. The action is not on
that endorsment. The action is likewise,
not on any supposed warranty arising
from the sale of the check by the Carlisle
Bank to the New Bank. The check was
genuine. The drawer had a deposit in
bank to meet it. It does not appear that
the Carlisle Bank knew that payment
had been countermanded. If it did, so
did the New Bank. If the former bank
should have suspected from the age of the
check, that something was wrong, so
should the latter bank.
But, the action is not against the Carlisle Bank, but against Smith. On what
theory can the New Bank resort to Smith?
The check was presented by the Carlisle
Bank. It was the property of that bank.
The money paid it, was its money. It
wa%not the agent of Smith for collection.
It had bought the check from him, and
given him credit in his deposit account.
It was acting, then, in its negotiation with
the plaintiff, not representatively, but as
a principal. If the right to recover rests,
as thelearned court below has maintained,
on the fact that the plaintiff has paid
money which the payee in good conscience, should not have received, reimbursement should be sought from that
payee. Instead of seeking it from him,
the plaintiff has sued one with whom it
did not deal, to whom or to whose agent,
it paid nothing. This we think, is inadmissible.
The Carlisle Bank, so far as appears, had
no knowledge of the revocation of the
check. It paid full value for it. It could
obtain reimbursement on its failure to collect from the New Bank, only by an action on Smith's endorsement or implied
warranty rf the check, for it does not appear that, when the New Bank discovered
its mistake, and attempted to obtain reimbursement, Smith had any deposit with
the Carlisle Bank. What the result of an
action on the endorsement or warranty
would have been is doubtful. The Carlisle Bank was therefore a holder of the
check for value, and the return of it to that
bank, and the compelling of that bank to
refund the money to the New Bank,
might have caused loss to it. It had a
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right to present the check, and to assume
that if the check was for any reason, not
good, the drawee would refuse to honor
it. It presented the check. No objection
was made to payment. The Carlisle Bank
got the money. It does not appear that
the New Bank notified it early or indeed
ever, of the mistake. Important changes*
in the capacity of the Carlisle Bank to recover reimbursement from Smith may
have meantime occurred. It is clear, we
think, that no action could be maintained
by the plaintiff against the Carlisle Bank.
Cf. Bank v. Bank, 159 Pa. 46.
Perhaps for this reason the experiment
was tried of passing over the Carlisle
Bank and suing Smith. But how can
Smith be liable? Not on his endorsement.
The plaintiff is the drawee, who has accepted and paid the check. It cannot sue
on the endorsement.
Nor has it sued
thereupon. Is Smith liable on an implied
warranty? The same answer is appropriate. The warranty does not inure to
the benefit of the drawee, and the action
is not on a warranty. Is Smith liable on
a quasi-contract, implied in his having received money from the plaintiff which
the latter paid under mistake, and which
he could neither receive nor retain in good
conscience? Possibly Smith could not
have received the money in good conscience; but, unfortunately for the plaintiff, he did not receive it from the latter.
All the money he has ever received upon
the check, he received from the Carlisle
Bank, and before the New Bank nad paid
the check. We are unable to realize a
ground on which the New Bank should
recover from Smith with whom it has
never been in relation, and who has obtained nothing from it.
Judgment reversed.
BEEGLE vs. COUNTY OF BEDFORD.
Interpretation of act of July 14, 1897Mileage allowed to witnesses-Costs
allowed to private policemen.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In the case of the Commonwealth v.
George B. Cooper, the District Attorney
certified to the County Commissioners on
oath of C. D. Beegle, policeman for
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. a bill of costs for
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committing defendant to jail $1.00; for
subpoenaing eighty-three witnesses at
15 cents each, $12.45; travelling 189 miles,
$22.68. There were subpoenaed in this
case five persons from Lockport, near
Niagara Falls, New York, which witnesses travelled by way of Pittsburg, 391
miles in the State of Pennsylvania, and
were in attendance at court four days.
The bill of costs is not approved in full
and the County Commissioners in answer
to a rule to show cause why these costs
should not be paid say that the bill of C.
D. Beegle-is in violation of the Act of July
14, 1897, P. L. 266, and that the shortest
and most usual travelled railroad route
from Bedford, Pennsylvania, to Lockport,
New York, is by way of Tyrone and Lock
Haven, and allowed each of the five witnesses mileage for only 227 miles to state
line.
COOPER and CORE for plaintiff.
Beegle did not perform these duties
within the scope of his employment as a
private policeman. 9 Kulp 25.
As the services rendered by plaintiff
are not those contemplated by the act of
July 14, 1897, he is entitled to recover the
full amount of his bill. Boyle v. County
of Luzerne, 8 Kulp 147; Young v. Harold,
7 Kulp 285.
CRARY and MYERS for defendant.
Where a witness comes from without
the State he is entitled to be paid mileage
from the State line by the shortest railroad route from his residence to place of
trial. 13 Pa. C. C. 330; 1 Pa. C. C. 10.
This act applies to serving a warrant of
arrest and all duties pertaining to policemen. Weaver v. Schuykill county, 9
Dist. Rep. 467; McAllister v. Armstrong
County, 20 Pa. C. C. 201.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
We are of opinion that the commissioners are in error in contending that the act
of July 14, 1897, bars the whole of C. D.
Beegle's claim. The act applies only to
"services rendered or performed by him of
any kind or nature whatever pertaining
to his office or duties as a noliceman."
Therefore, for acts done by him outside of
his regular duties as a policeman of the Pa.
R. R. Co., and in some other capacity,
his right to compensation must be determined without any reference to that act.
We think he is entitled to compensation
for serving the eighty-three subpoenas at
the rate of fifteen cents each, making a
total of $12.45. In so doing he was per-

forming the duties of a deputy sheriff and
he is therefore entitled to a deputy's fees.
It was not required of him, as a railroad
policeman, to serve the subpoenas. The
fact that he was a railroad policeman did
not preclude him from acting in any other
capacity. Com. ex. rel. Jones v. Lloyd,
Controller 9 Kulp 25.
From what we have been able to ascertain from the obscure and unintelligible
statement of facts, we think his claim for
committing defendant to jail, $1.00, and
arresting defendant, $1.00, is not sufficiently established by the facts to justify
an allowance of payment to him. The
capacity in which he acted in performing
these services is the test of his right. Until he shows a prima facie right to compensation he is not entitled to it, and the
mere fact that he is in court does not
amount to anything in this respect. It is
not within the power of the court to presume facts. This would be dispensing
with evidence and entirely in opposition
to the fundamental principles of the administration ofjustice. Arresting and taking to jail are duties which policemen of
corporations are often called upon to perform; and when they are performed as
corporation policemen, compensation for
such services must be sought in .the salary
paid by their employers, according to the
act of July 14, 1897.
The same argument applies to the claim
for mileage. What was the occasion
for traveling the 184 miles ? The law
allows compensation for traveling only
when such expenses are incurred incidentally in the execution of the laws. Our
attention has not yet been called to,
neither have we been able to find any
cases which hold that the county is liable
in any case to pay mileage to a railroad
policeman when he travels as a servant or
employee of the railroad. At least in
the present case it is not shown by the
plaintiff, that any traveling was done
in an official capacity. The mere fact that
the item appears in the bill raises no legal
presumption of any kind.
The commissioners were right in allowiug the five witnesses mileage to the state
line by the shortest and most usually
traveled route. Since they are not parties
in the present proceeding, the courts
are open to them for any action they may
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wish to take in the matter. Johnson v.
R. R. Co., 1 Pa. C. C. 10; Venetian Blind
v. Nesbit, 13 Pa. C. C. 330.
Fox, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The act of February 27, 1865, 2 P. & L.
3955, authorizes the appointment by the
governor of persons who may be designated by railroad companies, as policemen "for said corporation." The persons
appointed are to "possess and exercise all
the powers of policemen of the city of
Philadelphia, in the several counties
through which the road runs, and in the
offices of the recorders of which, certified copies of their oaths of office shall be
filed. The keepers of jails or lock-ups are
to receive all persons arrested by such
policemen for offences against the laws
committed upon or along the railroads or
the premises of such corporations."
Beegle, a policeman of the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, presents a claim
against the county of Bedford for various
fees. For arresting a defendant he demands $1.00 ; and for committing him to
jail he demands S1.00. We shall assume
that the arrest was for breach of law
"upon or along" the railroad or its premises, although this does not appear. Is
the county liable to pay these fees?
The act of July 14, 1897, P. L. p. 266,
directs that all corporations employing
policemen, shall pay to them a "fixed or
stipulated salary," and makes it unlawful for such policemen to "charge or accept" any additional fee for any service
"pertaining to his office or duties as a
policeman, except public rewards and the
legal mileage allowed for traveling expenses." We must, understand that the
arrest and commitment for which compensation is sought, were in the course of
the plaintiff's duty. The act of February
27, 1865, distinctly mentions arrest and
commitment as functions of corporation
policemen. Commonwealth v. Baird, 21
Pa. C. C. 488, Cf. Smith v. N. Y. etc. R.
R. Co. 149 Pa. 249. It also gives to them
the powers of Philadelphia policemen,
which include that of arresting and committing. Beegle was therefore not entitled
to other compensation. The act of 1865
itself provides that the compensation of
these policemen shall be paid by their
companies, 2 P. & L. 3956. Weaver v.
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Schuylkill county, 17 Super. 327. It is
not'the duty of Bedford county to pay to
Beegle what he cannot receive without
crime.
Beegle has subpcenaed eighty-three witnesses, as we must assume, for his corporation. An officer, a party, a private person,
can serve a subpoena. Youngv. Harold, 7
Kulp 285; Carroll v. Petry, 15 W. N. C.
416. It is not the duty of Philadelphia
policeman, so far as we know, to serve subpoenas at the instance of that city, (.
Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 9 Kulp 25, but
nothing prevents a contract between the
corporation and its policeman stipulating
that the latter shall serve subpenas. If
it does, the compensation agreed upon
would. cover this with other services, and
compensation from the county in addition
would be improper. Unfortunately we
know too little of the nature of the contract between the Pennsylvania R. R.
Company and Beegle, and too little of the
occasion for the service of the subpoenas
to have a firm judgment as to the propriety of this charge. We cannot convict
the court below of error, upon the record
before us, a~d, in the absence of evidence
as to the contract with the Railroad Coipany, may probably assume that it did not
enumerate the service of subpenas for the
company as a part of Beegle's duties.
Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 9 Kulp 25.
Although the learned court below has
allowed Beegle fees for serving subpcenas,
at the sheriff's rate of 15 cents each, 1 P. &
L. 2046; Cf. Mleagher v. Clearfield county,
3 D. R. 444; Wadlinger, Costs, P. 343, it
has refused to him mileage for the distances traveled, apparently in making
such service. If he was entitled to the
one he was also entitled to the other.
But, the mileage fee is but six cents
a mile, circular, whereas the plaintiff
claims at the rate of twelve cents.
The court below took the correct view
of the method of ascertaining the distance
for which witnesses are entitled to mileage.
With the modification suggested, concerning Beegle's mileage, the judgment
of the court below is affirmed.
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SIMS' ESTATE.
Administrator's account- Exceptions to
the allowance of credits, and to the
omission of assets-Burden of proof on
administrator to justify his credits-On
heirs, to show additional assets-Presumption as to compensationfor services
renderedby children to parents-Counsel fees-Administrator'scommissions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
William McLeod, administrator of Arthur Sims, deceased, filed his account of
the said estate. Various credits were
asked for attorney's fees paid, for an allowance to a son for nursing, and for compensation to the administrator. Exceptions were filed by an heir to the various
payments mentioned. Also that the administrator had failed to charge himself
with $2,000 of funds received.
Upon the day fixed all parties appeared
before the auditor. No evidence was offered by either side. Thereupon the auditor dismissed the exceptions and recommended that the account be confirmed.
Exceptions are filed by the heir, who
claims that it was the duty of the admintrator to show that all the property was
accounted for, and to substantiate the
credits claimed, the only evidence of the
payment of these last sums being receipts
which were filed with the account before
the register.
MACCONNELL and LAUBENSTEIN for the
plaintiff.
Where credit claimed by accountant is
objected to, the burden is on him to prove
that it was a debt of deuedent or properly
incurred by himself. Douglass' Estate,
10 Dist. 479.
The burden is on accountant to show
that he is entitled to compensation
claimed. Mutchinson's Estate, 9 Dist.
293.
DAvis and MooN for the defendant.
The account of the administrator being
accompanied with proper vouchers, the
auditor was justified in confirming the report. Estate of Carr Minors, 14 Phila.
265; Verner's Estate, 6 Watts 250.
The auditor's decision upnn a question
of fact is conclusive, unless there has been
a clear mistake. Chew's Appeal, 4.5 Pa.
228 ; White's Appeal, 36 Pa. 134 ; Fahnestock's Appeal, 104 Pa. 46.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

William McLeod was administrator of

Arthur Sims' estate, and upon the filing
of his account of said estate, he gave in
evidence before the register receipts for
money paid out by him in settlement of
the estate.
Exceptions were filed by the heir to the
various payments mentioned in said
account ; also to the fact that the administrator had failed to charge himself with
$2,000 of the funds received.
An auditor was appointed and the parties appeared, but no evidence was offered
by either side, thereupon the auditor dismissed the exceptions and recommended
that the account be confirmed. The heir
now files exceptions, and claims it was
the duty of the administrator to show
that all of the property was accounted for,
and to substantiate the credits claimed.
Two questions confront the court in the
above cases, viz : Is it the duty of an administrator in settling the accounts of a
decedent to substantiate his claims by
showing that all money paid out by him
vas due from the estate, and that his account is a true statement of the resources
and liabilities of said estate?
The second question before the court is:
Should it be the duty of an administrator to show the above facts, then has he
complied with the requirements?
By the Act of Assembly of March 15,
1832, it is made the duty of every register
before allowing the accounts of an administrator, that he shall carefully examine
the same, and require the production of
the necessary vouchers of the several items
contained therein.
We think the object of this statute was
for the prevention of fraud by the administrator upon those interested in the estate, and it is the duty of the register,
when the statute is not complied with, to
refuse to allow the claims of the administrator, but when the statute is complied
with, then itis his duty to receivesaid account and confirm it. Itis true, as shown
by Roemig's Appeal, 84 Pa. 236, that
many of the small items need not be accompanied with vouchers, such as railroad fares, etc., but only such are excused.
It is also true that the register has a very
limited, means of ascertaining as to the
correctness of these vouchers, and if the
statement of the administrator contains
all of the resources and liabilities of the
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deceased's estate. But, having been confirmed by the register, the presumption
is at once raised, that it was correct and
the requirements of the statute complied
with. Should there be no exceptions
filed, this presumption would become conclusive, and should exceptions be made by
the proper parties, the presumption could
be rebutted, and we think it wouldebe
upon the parties who deny the fact to
prove that the account is erroneous.
We think the statute of March 15, 1832
makes it the duty of an administrator to
substantiate his account before it can be
confirmed, and when he has performed
this duty, then his account should be allowed, after which it isthe duty of theexceptants to show what they claim.
According to the facts McLeod produced
the necessary vouchers as required by the
statute, which satisfied the register as to
the correctness of his claim, and it was
the duty of the heir to show that this account was incorrect. Exceptions are dismissed.
BORYER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The administrator of this estate, claims
credit, in his account, for fees paid to his
attorney, for payment to one of decedent's
sons for nursing the decedent, and for
commissions due to himself as administrator. Exceptions to these credits are filed.
There is an exception, also, to the omission of the accountant to charge himself
with $2,000 funds of the estate received by
him in excess of what he charges himself
with.
Before the auditor, no evidence in support of, or in response to the exceptions,
was tendered by anybody. The auditing
judge has therefore dismissed them. Was
this correct?
It was right to dismiss the exception to
the defective charge. If the exception were
ipso facto taken as true, unless repelled by
evidence, the exceptant might allege that
there were $2,000, or $20,000, or $200,000
more assets than those accounted for,
and it would be largely in his power to
swell the estate ad libitum. Generally,
the other next of kin have as much knowledge of the estate as the administrator.
They should at all events be expected to
give some evidence of reason for believirng
that there were additional assets, and as

much thereof as the exception alleges. 19
Encyc. P1. & Pr. 1045. It is the exceptant
who affirms, "Ei ineumbit probatio qui
dicit, non quinegat."
But when the accountant claims credit
for paying a debt, he affirms both that
there was a debt, and that he has paid it.
McLeod in his account, asserts that one of
decedent's sons nursed him in his sickness,
and became entitled to a certain compensation, and that he has paid that compensation. Surely these assertions are not to
be accepted as true, until evidence of them
is furnished, if those who are interested in
the estate are not willing to concede their
correctness. The accountant should not
have paid the claim, unless he knew that
it was valid, nor unless, should the pay"mentbe challenged, he would be able to
furnish the proof of its validity. 19 Encyc.
Pl. & Pr. 1044, Gray's Estate, 2 Kulp. 45.
That the son nursed the father, McLeod,
who asserts it, ought to be able to prove.
He should not have paid, otherwise. If
he has paid, without sufficient proof of the
son's claim, he ought not to insist that
the next of kin shall acquiesce. He could
pay without evidence, if he chose, but he
could not by so doing, compel dissatisfied
persons to disprove the correctness of his
act. .Primafacie, when a son nurses his
father, neither expects that he will be remunerated. The practice is uniform, for
the accountant to justify his credits when
exceptions to them are filed, and if he does
not, he is sur-charged. Douglass' Estate,
10 D. R. 479; Appeal of Fross, 105 Pa. 258;
Burton's Estate, 15 C. C. 367; White's
Estate, 13 Phila. 287 ; Fulmer's Estate, 3
D. R. 457; Williamson's Estate, 6 W. N.
C. 452, 471.
Credits for payment to the attorney are
excepted to. What did the attorney do?
Did he earn the sum alleged to be paid?
Has that sum been in fact paid? It would
be excessively inconvenient, and would
lead to gross frauds, to lay down the principle that those who are not satisfied of
the rectitude of all payments made by the
accountant should be compelled, by evidence, to convict them of error.
The nature and amount of the estate,
disclosed by the inventory and account itself, may furnish evidence of need of an
attorney's services, and within limits, the
Orphans' Court takes judicial notice of
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the money worth of these services. But,
when the size of the compensation is not explainable from the apparent nature of the
estate, it is incumbent on the adininistrator to show the occasion for the service,
its kind, quantity and value.
The courts having adopted rules regulating commissions, specific evidence of
the labor of the accountant is often dispensed with: If he seems to have charged
more than the establisned rate, the burden is upon him to justify, not on the exceptants to discredit, the charge. Mutchmore's Estate, 9 D. R. 293; Long's Estate, 13 W. N. C. 14.
Decree reversed, exceptions reinstated,
with procedendo.
INSURANCE CO. vs. ENGINEERING
CO.
liability
Principaland agent-Principal's
for fraud andforgery of agenl-Princip a's right to repudiate contract-Implied raticationand waiver of defectRatification without full knowledge of
.facts.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Prior to May 1, 190], W. A. Todd, an
Insurance Broker, of Philadelphia, was
authorized by the Engineering and Construction Company to procure Contractors' Employers' and Contractors' Public
Liability Insurance for them in the plaintiff company.
Acting under this authorization he
made application through a duly authorized agent of the plaintiff company for
Contractors' Employers' Insurance on a
pay roll of $10,000 at the regular rate,
$2.65 ; he also presented an application for
Contractors' Public Liability Insurance
on a pay roll of $10,000, at 50 cents.
Upon being informed that the Public
Insurance could not be written for less
than $1.00, he agreed to the increase, and
when the policy was delivered to him as
the agent of the Engineering and Construction Company, he paid the agent of
the plaintiff company $365, the premium
thereon at the above rates and received
his commission for the same.
Some question having arisen as to Mr.
Todd's transactions, the auditor of the
plaintiff company called upon the assured
and upon inspecting the policy found that

it had been altered, so that the pay roll
was represented to be $50,000, and the
rate of the Employers' Liability Insurance had been changed from $2.65 to
$1.25, and that of the Public Liability Insurance from $1.00 to 50 cents. The representative of the Engineering and Construction Company admitted that he had
authorized Mr. Todd to secure insurance
in both classes on a pay roll of $50,000, at
the rates named in the altered policy, and
that he had given him, payable to his
order, a check for $875 in payment of the
premiums thereon, $.510 of which Mr.
Todd appropriated to his own use.
Clause "C" of the special agreements in
the policy reads as follows: "The premium is based on the compensation of the
employes to be expended by the assured
during the period of the policy. If-the
compensation actually paid exceeds the
sum stated in the schedule attached hereto, the assured shall pay the additional
premium earned; if less sum than the
sum stated, the company will return to
the assured the unearned premium pro
rata."
During the life of this policy, the insured
have had several accidents in and about
their works. Suits for damages thereon
were instituted by the injured, and such
suits were settled and damages paid by
the Insurance Company.
Now the Insurance Company brings
this action to recover the difference between the premium actually paid, namely,
$365, the premium on $10,000 pay roll at
$2.65 and $1.00 per hundred, and the premium of the actual risk, namely, $1825,
the premium on a $50,000 pay roll at $2.65
and $1.00 per hundred, claiming that
Todd, the broker, was the agent of the assured, and as such the assured was responsible for his wrongful acts.
RHODES, J., and RIcKERNELL for the
plaintiff.
Broker's acts, statements and representations made or done within scope of his
authority are binding upon his principal.
Smalley v. Morris, 157 Pa. 349; Freedman v. Ins. Co., 182 Pa. 64 ; Oil Co. v.
Ins. Co., 64 N. Y. 85.
The principal is bound by fraudulent
acts of his agent acting within scope of
his
authority. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Pratt,
2 Binn. 308; Vanderslice v. Ins. Co. 13
Super. 455; Keonugh v. Leslie, 92 Pa.
424.
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GERBER

and DONAHOE for the defend-

ant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff company is liable in damages to all the employees of the Engineering and Construction Company for accidents to them occurring while at the same
time the defendant company compensates
the Insurance Company for assuming the
risk. In other words, the defendant company instead of paying such damages itself, as each injury occurs, employs the
Insurance Company at a fixed rate to gettie all damage cases arising. The larger
the pay roll, the greater is the risk. According to the Insurance Company's basis
of estimation, a pay roll of $50,000 implies
that five times as many men are employed as under a $10,000 pay roll. Hence
the Insurance Company's liability is five
times greater than it originally contracted
to assume and this by misrepresentation.
The evidence shows, (1) Thatthe actual
pay roll is $50,000; (2) That Todd was
authorized to secure insurance on such a
pay roll in both classes of insurance, and
(3) That the Insurance Company paid
damages on the basis of a $50,000 pay roll,
in settlement of several suits instituted by
employees. Could the plaintiff company
recover if the defendant company had directly and without the employment of a
broker, obtained the insurance on a pay
roll of $10,000, when In fact it is $50,000?
Would the law permit the defrauding
party to set up its own wrong to defeat
its obligation? We think not. 24 Pa. 62;
2.5 Pa. 441. Cases are numerous which
hold that assumpsit is a proper action
even where a tort has been committed.
66 Pa. 384; 44 Pa. 9; 78 Pa. 84; 35 Pa.
351 ; 18 Wend. 42-5. And the principle involved in these cases seems to be unjust
enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff. On this principle
recovery may be had whether the transaction is tainted with fraud or not. The elements of this principle are present in the
case at hand. The defendant company is
receiving benefits for which it has not
paid, and if the amount of compensation
for the same is ascertained and due, we
can see no objection to a recovery in assumpsit for the benefits conferred. Clause
"C" itself explains the intention of the
parties. It implies that compensation on
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a$50,000 pay roll is paid, and that at the
expiration of the policy, a further settlement or adjustment is to take place. If
said clause implies payment of such compensation, we infer that the same is at
least due, and according to the evidence,
four-fifths thereof unpaid. Thereareadditional reasons for believing that four-fifths
of the premium is due. First, it is the
general rule of all insurance companies
that the premium is payable when the
policy is delivered with the intention that
it shall be binding. Wood v. Poughkeepsie Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 619; Penna.
Ins. Co. v. Carter, 11 At]. 102. Second,
the Engineering and Construction Co.
gave a check in paymc-nt of the premium
when they ordered the insurance to besecured. They, thereby themselves recognize that premium is due when insurance
is in force. The amount so due is ascertained on the same basis as is paid on a
$10,000 pay roll. Where there is an established rate for property of the character designated to be insured, iris presumed
that the parties contracted with reference
to such rate. 97 Mich. 493; 62 N. Y. 598.
The same principle is applied where B
hires at an agreed price for a certain time,
and continues after the expiration of such
time without a new agreement. The presumption is that he is entitled to the original rate of compensation. Ranck v Al°
bright, 36 Pa. 367.
So, too, where a stage company upon
agreement to pay, to a turnpike company,
a gross sum as tolls for a year, and after
the expiration of the year, continued to
use the road, the court held thestage company liable at the rates fixed in the original agreement. Good Intent Co. v.
Hartzell, 22 Pa. 277. Search -for cases deciding this exact case or all the principles
thereof involved in one case has proved
fruitless. Some cases approach it, we
think, in one principle, and others in another. Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co.,
21 Pa. 466, recognizes the right to a greater
premium if the risk is increased by some
undisclosed fact at the time of contract.
The right of the insurance companies to
be compensated for the benefits and protection by them given is also recognized
by the Act of June 23, 1885, authorizing
the companies not to pay the face value of
the policy, when the age of the insured
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was incorrectly given in good faith, but
"such sum as the premium would have
purchased at the applicant's real age at
the time of effecting the insurance."
The counsel agree that the element of
agency does not change the result, agreeing that Todd was the agent of the insured and not that of the Insurance Company. 100 Pa. 137; 182 Pa. 64; 2 Super.
Ct. 431. Act of 1876 makes him an insurance broker, and, as such, agent of the insured. Neither can he be regarded as the
agent of both companies by taking a coinmission from the Insurance Company. 83
N. Y. 168; L. R. A. (U. S. C. C. of Appeals) B'k 47, page 450.
The fact that its agent paid a higher
rate in violation of his instructions is the
same as if the defendant company had itself done so on the ground that a principal is responsible for the fraudulent acts
and representations of his agent, made in
the course of the business of the agency,
or within its apparent scope. 1 Grant 17;
2 Binn. 308 ; 157 Pa. 349 ; 92 Pa. 424 ; 100
Pa. 137. Though the courts of some states
insist upon the rigid rule that the fraud
must be committed for the benefit of the
principal in order to hold the latter liable,
our courts seem to hold him liable for the
agent's fraud even if committed for his
own benefit if the fraud is so Iar within
the scope of his ostensible authority as to
warrant third persons in relying upon it.
There is no doubt that Todd's misrepresentations were made at least within his
apparent scope of authority. That Todd
did not apprise his principal of the contract rate and the reduction in the amount
of the pay roll does not change the conclusion. Full knowledge of the entire
transaction is imputed to the defendant
company; it, as principal, being legally
bound to know that of which the agent
has been informed relative to matters pertaining to third persons, during the continuance of the agency. 23 Pa. 445; 116
Pa. 308 ; 81 Pa. 256.
The responsibility rests with the Engineering and Construction Co. They placed
their faith in him and thereby made it
possible for him to defraud both parties.
The whole transaction thus stands as that
of the defendant company itself, leaving
the conclusion first reached unaffected.
There being no evidence that the con-

struction company offered to rescind the
original contract, or to pay the balance of
premium due on a $50,000 pay roll, no
further objection seems to present itself to
a recovery in the amount claimed as a
measure of the compensation due the Insurance Company and of the unjust enrichment to the Engineering and Construction Company. Judgment for the
plaintiff company.
ROUSER, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Todd, acting for the defendant, procured
from the plaintiff an insurance against the
defendant's liability to its employes and
others, for the results of negligence. The
plaintiff undertakes to pay all damages,
in consideration of premiums paid to it.
It measures its risk not by the number of
hands employed by the defendant, but by
the aggregate compensation paid to them.
On every hundred dollars paid to hands,
it demands $2.65 as premium for indemnifying against employes' claims, and $1.00
as premium for indemnifying against
"public liability." Todd agreed for defendant, to take insurance, on the basis of a
pay roll of $10,000. The policy was prepared and executed, and Todd paying
$365, the premium, was delivered to him.
Todd had been employed by the defendant to procure insurance, on a pay roll
of $50,000, at a premium of $1.75 per hundred dollars of wages paid, and had received, to be paid over to the plaintiff as
premium, $875. Todd obtaining the policy described, appropriated to himself the
difference between $875 and $365. In order
t6 prevent the detection by the defendant
of his wrongful act, he altered the policy, so as to make it one of insurance on
the basis of a pay roll of $50,000, at $1.75
per hundred.
The policy contained the stipulation, in
substance, that if the actual pay roll during the year should be less than that
stated in the policy, the company would
return a proportionate part of the premium, and that if it should be greater
than that mentioned in the policy, the assured should pay a proportionately greater
premium. The action is by the Insurance
Company to obtain Ehis greater premium.
The original policy contained this clause,
so that itadvised thedefendant thatits liability for premiums would be measured by
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the pay roll. It does notappearwhen the
defendant first became aware of the alteration of the policy. The alteration had
doubtless been made before it was delivered by Todd to his principal. Several accidents occurred during the lifeof the policy, for which suits were instituted. The
plaintiff fulfilled its contractual duty by
satisfying the claimants and settling the
suits.
We are informed by the evidence, that
the premium for the "actual risk," viz :
$1,825, is due the plaintiff, or in other
words, that the pay roll amounted to $50,000 instead of $10,000. If the contract is
to be enforced, as it was written, by the
plaintiff, it is entitled to the difference between $1,825 and $365.
It may be well here to say that it sufficiently appears that the period of the
policy had expired when the action was
brought.
Todd was the agent of the defendant.
His business was to procure from the
plaintiff an insurance, at the rate of $1.75
per hundred, on a pay roll of $50,000. The
insurance he did procure was for a higher
premium, and on'a smallar pay roll. Did
his act of directing the execution of the
policy, paying the premium, and accepting the policy bind his principal? The
limitation as to the pay roll is not important, because the policy itself provides for
an adjustment of the premium, at the end
of the period of insurance, should the
actual pay roll exceed that assumed in the
policy. Practically thd ease before us is
that of a direction by the defendant to
Todd to buy an indemnity of a certain
kind-at one price, and of his actual purchase of it at another and higher price.
Possibly, though authorities are strangely
few upon the point, the defendant, on
having the transaction reported to it,
might have repudiated the contract and
recovered back the money. Cf. 1 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. 1020; though Todd being a
broker had, we think, apparent authority
to make the contract which he did, and
could bind his principal. [See Worth v.
Ellis, 4 Del. 336, where A, who had authorized his agent to buy cows of a certain
color, was obliged to pay for the cows
bought by the agent, although they were
of another color, the seller not knowing of
the limit on the discretion of the agent.]

The policy was, however, delivered to
the defendant, who did not repudiate it.
The year was suffered to elapse, and the
plaintiff had no suspicion that the contract was to be questioned or was questionable. Accidents happened. Labor
was incurred in soliciting and money expended in effecting settlements. The
plaintiff had a right to expect notice of
non-conformity of the contract made by
Todd with his instructions, if there was in
the judgment of the defendant such nonconformity, and if defendant intended to
insist on it. The Engineering Company
seemed, to the plaintiff, to recognize the
contract. We think this non-repudiation
with its probable result on the plaintiff,
equivalent to ratification or adoption of
the contract, or a waiver of the defects in
it. Of. Williams v. Sawyer, 155 Pa. 129.
The defendant took advantage of the
contract, notified the plaintiff, of suits
pending against it, or of accidents that
would likely lead to suits, and enjoyed the
exoneration resulting from the plaintiff's
efforts and expenditures. Had it known,
at this time, of the fraudulent acts of Todd,
it surely wduld not be allowed to say, afterwards, that these acts did not bind it.
Penn. N. Gas Co. v. Cook, 123 Pa. 170; McNeile v. Cridland, 168 Pa. 16; Keough v.
Leslie, 92 Pa. 424; Kramer v. Dinsmore,
152 Pa. 264.
Todd was the agent of the defendant,
not simply to procure the execution of the
policy, but to accept it and deliver it to the
defendant. In holding it, he was no
longer dealing with the plaintiff. The
forgery which he committed was in no
way to be imputed to the plaintiff. Its
right of action on the original policy was
not impaired by it. Nordo we thinkthat
the effect of his act, in preventing the
defendant's discovery of his deviation from
his instructions, and of his embezzlement
of defendant's money, is to be charged on
the plaintiff. The defendant ought to
have examined the policy. If it did, and
did not detect the alteration, why should
this effect of that alteration be visited on
the plaintiff? It led to what seemed to
plaintiff a ratification of the policy, as issued, and plaintiff did acts which it would
not have done, but for this apparent ratification. That the apparent ratification
was caused by the defendants' agent's
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fraud and forgery, can by no meausjustify
the transfer of the loss from the defendant
to the plaintiff.
We are aware that there are cases which
hold that ratification cannot be bindingly
made without knowledge of the facts, but
when the party whose agent makes the
contract does not dissent from it, and,
rather, claims and receives benefits under
it, we think he makes the contract binding
on him, (the other party not knowing of
the agent's departure from instruction,)
whatever may be the cause (other than
the act of the opposite party) of the principal's non-dissent. If the law concedesto
him the privilege of repudiating a contract
made by his agent, because it is in excess
of particular instructions, this privilege
must be qualified with the condition that
it be exercised in a reasonably prompt
manner, and that performance of the contract from the opposite party shall not be
demanded or accepted. Concealment by
the agent of the fact of his departure from
instructions will not excuse from prompt
repudiation.
The Insurance Company has probably
paid thousands of dollars in shielding the
defendant from suits. The number of
these suits and the size of the damages
recoverable therein, are affected by the
size of the pay roll. The larger that roll,
the greater the number of employes therein, or the higher the wages paid to them.
It would be inequitable to allow the defendant to have the benefit of the contract
without bearing its burden. Qui sentit
commodum, sentit et onus.
Judgment affirmed.

cessary, and that the applicant, on account
of his conduct a year before, was unfit, was
presented. The court re-considered the
question, opened the order granting the license and denied the application; but making no order for the return of the license
fee, or for indemnifying him for the expense in fitting of the place for the busitess.

MoON and

DRUbiHELLEI

for the ap-

pellant.
Remonstrance to be filed on or before the
Friday next preceding day fixed for hearing. Act of May 13, 1887; Kohler's License, 1 District Reports547, Actof June 9.
1891 ; Bowman's Appeal, 167 Pa. 644 ; 2
Central Reporter, 140; Boinjohn's Application, 2 Pa. C. C. 33; 1 Pa. C. C. 369.
BORYER and LONGBOTTOM for appellee.
Court has power under Act of March22,
1867, to revoke duly granted licenses to
sell intoxicating liquors upon sufficient
cause being shown. 108 Pa. 564; 2 Pa. C.
C. 37; 2 Pa. C. C. 78 ; 1 Pa. 326; 120 Pa.
328; 114 Pa. 452; 11 Pa. C. C. 406. Supreme Court will not inquire into conclusions of fact by lower court unless arbitrarily made. Gross's License, 161 Pa.
544; 161 Pa. 375.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

This case comes before this court on an
appeal, taken by McAdams from an order
of the court of Quarter Sessions revokinga
license duly granted to him to sell intoxieating liquors.
In making his first application, the license was granted without any remonstrance being filed against him. Four
weeks later a remonstrance was filed by a
majority of the voters in his ward, setting
forth three primary considerations: First,
the necessity for the house; second, the
fitness of the applicant; third, the sufMcADAMS' APPEAL.
ficiency of the accommodations.
The first qualification is the most diffiHYotel licenses--Revocation--Bemoynrtrances
cult and important to find because theAct
filed after license granted-Act of May
of May 13, 1887, Section 7, P. L., declares
13, 1887.
against granting unnecessary license; and,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
besides, the other two requisites may be
McAdams was licensed by the Quarter
proved or provided. As the fitness of the
applicant cannot always be decided from
Sessions, as a saloon keeper for one year,
the evidence, but may depend upon the
there being no remonstrance against licharacter of the place, personal knowledge
censing his place. He paid the license fee
and began the business. Four weeks after,
and other circumstances, there can be no
uniform rule upon which a license may
a remonstrance numerously signed, in fact
be granted or refused upon this ground.
by a majority of the voters of the ward,
Chief Justice Agnew, in delivering an
excusing the delay of the remonstrants,
opinion of the Supreme Court in Schlanand alleging that the place was unfit, that
decker v. Marshall, 22 P. F. Smith, 202,
a licensed saloon at that place was unne-
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said: "Courts sit to administer the law
as it is given to them, and not to make or
repeal it. The law of the land has determined that license shall exist, and imposed upon the court the duty of ascertaining the proper instances in which it
shall be granted

* * *

*

* The discre-

tion in the court is, therefore, a soundjudicial discretion, and to be a rightful
judgment, it must be exercised in the particular case and upon the facts and circumstances before the court, after they
have been heard and duly considered; in
other words, to be exercised upon the
merits of each case, according to the rule
given by the Act of Assembly." From
this and other decisions too numerous to
cite, we find the granting of a license is
one of judicial discretion.
Having disposed of this feature of the
case, we must iext direct our attention
as to whether the court of Quarter Sessions exceeded its jurisdiction in revoking
appellant's license. For a proper understanding in leading us to a decision, we
must look to the Act of May 13, 1887, Section 7, P. L. 108, which provides as follows: "Such licenses may be granted only
by the court of Quarter Sessions of the
proper county, and shall be for one year
from date fixed by rule or standing order
of said court. The said court shall fix by
rule or standing order a time at which application for licenses shall be heard, at
which time all persons applying or making objections to applications for licenses
may be heard by evidence, petition, remonstrance or counsel." With the plain
meaning of this statute before them, can
the court overstep its bounds, and revoke
a license previously given by them, owing
to the caprice and prejudice of a few voters
of his ward? We think not, if they
wished to remonstrate, they must conform
to the statutory requirements, and not
complain because of their own laches.
The court is required to fix the time for
hearing applications and date from which
licenses shall take effect, and this it shall
do by rule or standing order. A separate
order cannot be made in any case, but one
general rule must govern all. The court
may change the rule or order, but not in a
particular instance. The legislative intent
was that all applications should be heard
at, and all licenses date from the same

time. A license issued on the order of
court of Quarter Sessions would be for one
year and this rule isas much a part of Act
of May 13,1887, as if it were written in and
constituted a part of it by the legislature.
In Kahrer's License, 12 C. C. Reports 12,
the court said: "The provisions of third
section of the Act of May 13, 1887, provid-"
ing for the adoption of rules by the court
are mandatory." The proceeding is therefore statutory, and the court can do that,
and that only, which is stated or implied
in the words of the statute. There is no
authority by which a judgment can be entered in violation of a s'atute and a foriner judgment entered in conformity with
the statutory provisions be revoked. In 5
( C. 462, Lackawanna County Licenses,
Judge Hand in his opinion, says: "The
Act of May 13, 1887, contemplates raising
the question of necessity and fitness by petition hnd remonstrance in the first instance, and not by exceptions subsequently
filed, and evidence will not be heard upon
these questions when the issue is not thus
properly raised." According to these decisions, remonstrautsbeing derelict to their
duty in not filing the remonstrance at the
proper time, they cannot be heard, and
in order to prevent the procuring of another license they must wait until the expiration of a year, and file their remonstrance in due time. But counsel for remonstrauts in their defence claim that the
court of Quarter Sessions has the power to
re-consider the application, and open an
order granting the license, and revoke the
same, and cite Dolans' Appeal, 108 Pa. 564,
that it is within the jurisdiction of the
court of Quarter Sessions "to revoke duly
granted licenses to sell intoxicating liquors
upon sufficient cause being shown." Also
in Hamilton's Application, 7 C. C. Reports, 113. Hamilton's license was refused
in March, 1889, and his counsel on June
29, 1889, twelve weeks later, moved the
court to open the order previously made
in the case and award the license. Remonstrants denied the power of that court
to do anything for him. But Wickham,
P. J., said, "The court of Quarter Sessions
has power to open an order refusing the license, and to grant the license, notwith-.
standing a full term has elapsed since the
hearing." The jurisdiction of the Quarter
Sessions in granting licenses is purely
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statutory, and therefore they have the
right to re-examine, modify or altogether
reverse their o~n decrees. While they
may reverse their own decrees, they cannot wilfully disregard the statute to do so.
We find in the former case cited by counsel for remonstrance there appears to have
been some violation of the liquor law
which is not to be reconciled with the
present case, while in the lattercase it only
decides the question whether the court of
Quarter Sessions has the power to re-consider and open an order granting the license and revoke the same. They, therefore, do not apply to the case before us, and
the revocation of the license is inequitable
and unjust, for having paid his license fee
and fitted up his place of business, and
being lulled into security by the aid of the
law, the revocation of the license is an arbitrary ruling and without some good
reason.

Appeal sustained, and order revoking
license granted to plaintiff in error. Reversed.
OSBORNE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The power of the court of Quarter Sessions to revoke a license is found in the
seventh section of the Act of May 13, 1887,
1 P. & L. 2704, which enacts that "upon
sufficient cause being shown, or proof
being made to the said court, that the
party holding a license has violated any
law of this commonwealth relating to the
sale of liquors, the court of Quarter Sessions shall, upon notice beinggiven to the
person so licensed, revoke the said license."
For breaches of the law after the issue of
the license, the revocation of it has often
taken place. Vide cases in P. & L. Dig.
Stat. 2705. Campbell's License, 8 Super.
524. But other causes than breach of law
are contemplated. "Sufficient cause," need
not be, as the above clause clearly implies,
a violation of law; 11 P. & L. Dig. Decisions, 19261, and a variety of non-criminal occurrences and incidents of the business, subsequent to the grant of the license, will induce the courts to recall the
licensee's authority to sell liquor.
In the case before us, the grounds for
revocation existed before the issue of the
license, or rather, they began before the

Issue, though they persist after it. The
place, it is charged, was, and remains unfit. Sale at that place was, and remains
unnecessary. Thelicensee, before the issue
of the license, had so conducted himself as
to show that at the time of the issue of it,
be was, and that he remains unfit, to have
the authority to sell. Can the court revoke the license for an unfitness of place
or person existing at the time of the revocation, if that unfitness originated before
the grant of the license? We see no good
reason for denying the power.
When the premises were in fact unfit,
but, on account of a mis-description of
them, the court granted the license in
ignoranee of their true character, it revoked. In re Hoyrick License, 9 Kulp,
368. Cf. Kelly's License, 20 Phila. 446. A
misrepresentation as to the citizenship of
the applicant will induce a revocation of
the license. Hoy's Application, 3 Mont.
188. Cf. Dolan's Appeal, 108 Pa. 564.
The business of liquor selling requires
a special permission from the court. The
court is to maintain a constant supervision of it, and though the license when
granted, is granted for a year, the license
does not, for the year, pass beyond the control of the court. The relation of the licensee, after he pays the fee, and after he
expends money in fitting up his place for
the basiness, is not to be assimilated to
that of a purchaser of a right which cannot be regulated, minified or even extinguished. The state can, during the year,
by new legislation, impair the value of the
license by restricting and hampering sales
under it.
Commonwealth v. Donahue,
149 Pa. 104; Commonwealth v. Sellers,
130 Pa. 32, and it may even prohibit sales
altogether. The court of Quarter Sessions
is the agent of the state.
If the refusal of a license was to be considered as a favor to the remonstrants, the
satisfaction of a right in them, we could
understand why their failure to present
their remonstraDce in time should be
held to preclude the consideration of it.
But the court, in refusing or recallinga license, is doing no favor to them. They
are simply the spokesmen of the community. Liquor selling may in the judgment
of the law easily degenerate into a scourge.
The public health and morals require that
it be in good hands, and hedged about by
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restrictions as to place, periods of sale,
personality of the purchaser, etc. The
court is the agent of the public, to enforce
these restrictions. It would be a convenience to an indolent, or timid, or popularity pursuing judge to have, or to be
believed to have, but little discretion; to
put the burden of denying licenses on the
remonstrants, and, they failing in promptitude, to take refuge behinditheir default.
It was not the intention of the law-makers,
we presume, that if a grossly unfit man,
or place was licensed, because citizens, for
some reason, failed betimes to remonstrate, he should continue to have the
power to sell for a year. Many breaches of
the law, and many improper ways of conducting the business, which could not be
branded as illegal, may escape detection.
In demanding evidence of the character
of the applicant and of his place, the law
seeks a guarantee that he will carry on
the business as little harmfully as possible. The community must not be compelled to endure for a whole year one who
does not furnish this guarantee, simply
because citizens have not been alert
enough to expose his unfitness, at the time
prescribed for the annual consideration of
license-applications.
It may seem harsh to withdraw the license after it has been paid for; or after
the licensee has spent money in adapting
his premises to the sale. So it is. But it
would be much worse to suffer the risk of
an unfit man selling for a year, at an unfit
place, intoxicants to minors, drunkards,
etc., and of his d~moralizing his neighborhood. It is better to make one man suffer in his purse, than to endure the risk of
his innoculating twenty, or fifty, or a
hundred with the virus of inebriety. It
must be remembered also, that the applicant for license impliedly avers his fitness,
the fitness of his place, etc. If he or his
place is in fact unfit, the court is, in a
sense, misled by him, and by those who
support his application. A sound policy
will not prohibit the retraction of the license, should the court discover its error,
however superinduced.
'We see no sufficient reason for the order
of the learned Superior Court in reversing
the order of the Quarter Sessions revoking
the license. The order of the former court
is reversed, and that of the latter is affirmed.

TIBBLE'S ESTATE.
Exceptions to auditor'sreport-Accommodation endorser-Surety-Characterof
liabilit .
STATMEENT OF THE CASE

Tibble obtained Win. Japes' endorsement on a note for Tibble's accommodation and had it discounted by the
Farmers and Merchants' Bank. He gave
Japes a note for the same amount to protect him for his endorsement. Tibble
dying, his estate wasinsolvent. The bank
presented the note which it had discounted. Japes also presented his note.
The auditor allowed a dividend on the
former, but not the latter.
HAI1BLIN and WELSH for exceptants.

Suretyship is established, and the surety
is entitled to be reimbursed out of the
estate for any losses which he sustains by
reason of such suretyship, Miller v. Pollock, 99 Pa. 202; Miller v. Howery, 1
Watts 474; Bank v. Douglas, 4 Watts, 95.
BISHOP and VASTINE for respondents.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Tibble obtained Win. Japes' endorsement on a note for his, Tibble's, accommodation, and had it discounted by the
Farmers and Merchants' Bank. Japes was
an accommodation endorser under section
63, article 5, of the negotiable instrument
act. An accommodation endorser is simply
a surety, but not so named in the act.
Tibble gave Japes a note for same amount
to protect him for his endorsement.
Tibble dying, his estate was insolvent. If
the bank could get all its claim out of the
estate, then the indemnity note to Japes
would be thereby satisfied. If the bank
did not get all its claim, Japes would be
liable for the balance. The bank presented
the note which it had discounted, Japes
also presented his note. The auditor
allowed a dividend on the former, but not
on the latter-Exceptions. The note given
by Tibble to Japes partakes of the nature
of an indemnity contract. Tibble, the
indemnitor, undertakes to protect Japes,
the indemnitee, from loss through aliability on the part of the latter to the bank.
The question for us to decide: Did Tibble
give the note to protect Japes from absolute
liability or to recompense him if he is
compelled to pay the bank? We think
the latter was the intention of Tibble.
We therefore are of the opinion that the
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indemnitee cannot recover until he has
suffered an actual loss or damage, in other
words, he is not entitled to indemnity
until he has been compelled to pay and
has paid the amount for which he is
liable as endorser upon Tibble's note.
The mere incurring of liability gives to
him no such right. If the note was to
indemnify Japes from absolute liability it
would present a different view, but under
the existing circumstances, the auditor
was clearly justified in disallowing the
claim of Japes until the bank was paid.
Exceptions dismissed.
MYERS, J.
OPINO N OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Japes endorsed the note of Tibble's, for his
accommodation. To protect him Tibble
gave to Japes a note for the same Amount.
Being payable absolutely, according to its
terms, the note was payable at the time
mentioned in it.
It did not matter
whether the principal note was then due
or not, nor whether, being due, Japes had
paid it. Japes had a right to the money,
in order that, out of it, he might discharge
the endorsement, or in order that, if he
had already paid the endorsement, he
might be indemnified. When Tibble died
therefore, there were two notes overdue,
that to the Farmers and Merchants' Bank
and that to Japes. There is no reason
that both should not be presented for payment, nor that both should not receive
dividends, provided that the sum of the
dividends should not exceed the debt.
Thus, the notes being for $1,000, if the
dividend on each was $500, the sum
would equal the debt. Japes would hold
the $500 awarded to him as a species of
trustee for the bank, which would thus be
paid in full. Emerson v. Paine, 176 Mass.
391. Should the dividend exceed fifty per
cent., the excess would not be payable, for,
in no event could more be taken than
sufficed to pay the bank in full.

The right to present a larger demand
than the debt actually due, for the purpose of obtaining a dividend not greater
than that debt, is illustrated in many
cases. If a creditor has a pledge, he may,
after an assignment, exhaust the pledge,
and though he thus reduces the debt, he
may obtain a dividend from the estate on
the unreduced debt, provided that the
sums thus obtained, added together, do not
exceed the actual debt. Assignments,
208. If a surety who pays the whole debt,
seeks contribution of one-half from a
co-surety now dead, he can obtain a
dividend on the whole debt, provided that
the amount awarded does not exceed onehalf of it. Cooper's Estate 4 Super, 615.
In the case before us, there are two claim.
ants for what is the same debt. It is not
a departure from precedent to allow
dividends on the double debt, to the two
several claimants, since one of them will
hold what he gets for the benefit of another.
The result would have been different, if
the note given to Japes had not been payable unless or until he had paid his endorsemeut. He could, as endorser, have
sued Tibble, after paying the note of the
Farmers and Merchants' Bank. His action
on the secondary note would have given
him substantially the same remedy. But,
the right of action whether on the endorsement or on the collateral note, would
not have arisen until he had paid the
primary note. If he had paid the primary
note, he would claim as ovner of it. He
would not be allowed to claim as owner of
it and of the secondary note. The secondary note would not have been intended
to be an additional security but an alternate security. Cummings v. Thompson,
7 Metc. 132; French v. Hayward, 16 Gray,
512.
Decree set aside with procedendo.

